The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Comparative Study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany by Mervyn A. King & Don Fullerton
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Comparative
Study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany
Volume Author/Editor: Mervyn A. King and Don Fullerton, eds.




Chapter Title: The Theoretical Framework
Chapter Author: Mervyn A. King, Don Fullerton
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11495
Chapter pages in book: (p. 7 - 30)The Theoretical Framework
Our aim is to examine the incentives to save and invest in the private
nonfinancial corporate sector offered by the tax system in each country.
Clearly, taxes are only one of the determinants of capital formation, and
our four countries exhibit many important differences beyond differences
in the taxation of capital income. But the structure of the tax system is
often cited as an impediment to economic growth, and it is under the
direct control of government. Taxation can affect many economic deci-
sions, including labor supply, work effort, enterprise, and risk taking, as
well as household savings and corporate investment in real assets. In this
study we focus on the flow of private savings into real corporate invest-
ment and the flow of profits that result from this investment back to
households. We do not explicitly discuss the effects of taxes on risk taking
or work effort, and our analysis is limited to the incentives to save and
invest. Since the exercise of "enterprise" usually involves some invest-
ment—that is, some sacrifice of present consumption for future returns—
our estimated effective tax rates bear closely on the incentives or disin-
centives provided by government to channel resources into entre-
preneurship.
2.1 The Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
The measurement of effective tax rates is not straightforward. Popular
discussion tends to concentrate on the tax burden on corporate profits,
especially in periods of rapid inflation. This corporate tax burden (or
average effective corporate tax rate) may be a misleading measure for
two reasons. First, it ignores the interaction between personal and corpo-
rate taxation. For example, interest payments that are deductible at the
corporate level are taxed in the hands of the personal sector upon receipt.The Theoretical Framework
The incentives to invest depend upon the combined weight of personal
and corporate taxes. Second, the tax burden measures the observed tax
rate on realized capital income. It does not measure the incentive for
additional investment which is a function of the marginal tax rate. In what
follows, we develop estimates of the effective marginal tax rate on capital
income for each of the four countries.
To do this requires a precise definition of the margin involved. The
margin considered here is a small increase in the level of real investment
in the domestic nonfinancial corporate sector, financed by an increase in
the savings of domestic households. An alternative marginal tax rate
would be that applicable to an increase in profits that did not result from
an addition to investment but that resulted, perhaps, from an unexpected
increase in selling prices. Although the latter definition has its place, the
former is preferred here because it is the margin relevant to the incentive
effects of taxation.
The empirical study is restricted to domestic savings and investment.
International capital flows are important in a number of areas, but the
intricacies of double tax agreements and of the accounting behavior of
multinational companies introduce complexities that are better deferred
to a separate study. In any event, the bulk of investment in each of the
countries studied here is financed domestically, and the effective tax rates
presented below give a fairly accurate picture of the incentives provided
by the different tax systems. Public-sector investment is also excluded
from our study. Its determinants are unrelated to the tax system, and our
focus is on taxation. Finally, we examine only corporate investment. This
limitation means we ignore not only unincorporated business but also
investment in residential housing. Again, most industrial investment is in
the corporate sector. Details of the size of the corporate sector and the
importance of foreign ownership of domestic capital are provided in the
respective country chapters.
To assess the impact of taxation on investment, two approaches may be
identified. The first is the econometric modeling of the process that
generates time-series observations on savings and investment. A major
problem with this approach is the complexity of the correct specification
of tax variables, not to mention uncertainty, adjustment costs, and pro-
duction lags. As a consequence, the very limited number of observations
that are available, even with quarterly data, contain insufficient informa-
tion for us to be confident of identifying the underlying process. More-
over, the relation between investment and taxation depends upon corpo-
rate financial policy and on the pattern of ownership of corporate
securities. There is no unique cost of capital to the corporate sector that is
independent of its ownership pattern and those other factors that deter-
mine its capital structure.
The second approach is to compute directly the tax "wedge" betweenThe Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
the rate of return on investment and the rate of return on savings for a
series of hypothetical marginal projects. In the absence of taxes, when
the saver puts up money to finance a project he earns a rate of return
equal to that earned on the project itself. With distortionary taxes the two
rates of return can differ. The size of the tax wedge depends upon the
system of corporate taxation, the interaction of these taxes with inflation,
the tax treatment of depreciation and inventories, the personal tax code,
the treatment of different legal forms of income (capital gains versus
dividends, for example), the existence of wealth taxes, and a number of
other details we examine below. It is clear, therefore, that the effective
tax rate on an investment project depends upon the industry where it is
located, the particular asset purchased, the way the investment is
financed, and the identity of the investor who supplies the finance. In this
study we shall compute estimates of the effective marginal tax rate for
many different combinations of these factors. Such estimates are not to
be regarded as a substitute for econometric analysis of investment be-
havior. Rather, they provide a description of the actual incentives offered
by the tax system. We hope they will be useful as inputs to future
econometric studies of investment and other aspects of corporate be-
havior. The effective tax rates calculated below are intended to summa-
rize a very complicated tax code in a way that is intuitively appealing.
The tax wedge is the difference between the rate of return on invest-
ment and the rate of return on the savings used to finance the investment.
We denote by p the pretax real rate of return on a marginal investment
project, net of depreciation. It is the return society earns on a particular
investment of one extra unit (dollar, pound, kroner, or mark). Let s
denote the posttax real rate of return to the saver (whether a household
or an institution) who supplied the finance for the investment. The tax
wedge, w, is simply the difference between the two rates of return:
(2.1) w=p-s.
The effective tax rate, t, we define to be the tax wedge divided by the
pretax rate of return:
(2.2) .->-?.
This definition of the tax rate is a "tax-inclusive" measure in which the
denominator includes the tax paid as well as the net income received. An
alternative "tax-exclusive" measure would divide the tax wedge by the
posttax return to the saver. This measure, te, is defined by:
(2.3) t = £Z£.
In presenting our results, we shall use all three measures of the distor-
tion caused by taxes, but we shall be concerned primarily with estimates10 The Theoretical Framework
of the effective tax rate in (2.2). Nevertheless, in some circumstances the
tax wedge may be more informative than the tax rate (when/7 is small, for
example).
The link between the saver and the company that carries out the
investment is the rate of return the company pays on the saver's financial
claims. For example, if the saver lends money to the company in the form
of a fixed-interest loan, then the company must pay an interest rate on the
loan. We denote the real rate of interest on such financial claims by r and
the corresponding nominal interest rate by i. If IT denotes the rate of
inflation, then in terms of instantaneous rates
(2.4) r = i->n.
The interest rate r plays an intermediate role between the investment
decisions by companies and savings decisions by households, and it is
important in our analysis. For any given investment project we may ask
the question, What is the minimum rate of return it must yield before
taxes in order to provide the saver with the same net of tax return he
would receive from lending at the market interest rate? This minimum
pretax rate of return is called the cost of capital. It depends upon the asset
and industry composition of the investment, the form of finance used for
the project, and the saver who is providing the funds. For a given
combination of these factors, we may express the relation between the
cost of capital and the interest rate as
(2.5) P = c(r).
The cost of capital function, c(V), depends upon the details of the tax
code, and we derive explicit expressions below.
Condition (2.5) may be thought of in two ways. On the one hand, we
may view it as an expression of capital market equilibrium that deter-
mines the marginal yield on real investment of different types, using
different financial instruments that would be chosen by profit-maximizing
firms in an economy with an interest rate r. In this case/? is determined by
r. On the other hand, we may think of (2.5) as indicating the maximum
interest rate such that savers would be indifferent between lending at this
rate and receiving the after-tax proceeds of a given type of project,
financed in a particular way, yielding a pretax return of p. In this case, the
causation runs from p to r. In our study we make use of both interpreta-
tions.
The relation between the market interest rate and the return to the
saver depends on the tax treatment of personal income. In none of the
four countries studied here is the personal tax base defined as real income
from capital. Rather, tax is charged on receipt of nominal interest in-
come. Hence the posttax real rate of return to the saver is given by
(2.6) s — (1 — m){r + IT) - TT — wp,11 The Measurement of Effective Tax Rates
where m is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income and wp is the
marginal personal tax rate on wealth. In the absence of taxes, p = s = r.
Savers provide funds to companies, these sums are invested in physical
assets, and the profits accruing on the project are then distributed either
to bondholders in the form of interest or to stockholders in the form of
dividends and share value appreciation. As a result, savers earn the same
rate of return on their savings as companies earn on their investment. In
practice, taxes drive a wedge between the return on investment and the
return on savings, and this wedge can be measured by comparing equa-
tions (2.5) and (2.6).
Using this approach, we measure effective marginal tax rates for each
of four countries. But even within a single country the tax rate varies from
one project to another depending upon the asset and industry in which
the funds are invested, the nature of the financial claims on the profits
(equity versus debt), and the ultimate recipient of the capital income. To
investigate the distribution of effective tax rates within each country, we
consider a series of hypothetical projects, where each project corre-
sponds to a particular combination of asset, industry, financial instru-
ment, and owner. The first set of calculations is for the effective marginal
tax rate on each project, where all projects are assumed to have the same
pretax rate of return. We call this the fixed-p case. For each project we
then compute the value of s, the real posttax return to savers the project
could sustain, from equations (2.5) and (2.6). From the fixed value of/?
and the calculated value of s, we compute both the tax wedge w and the
effective marginal tax rate t. To compare tax systems across countries, we
use the same value for p in all countries, and in most of our calculations
we take a value of 10 percent per annum. The relation between the
assumed value of p and the tax rate is discussed further below.
Comparing the tax rates corresponding to a common value for p
provides a picture of the incentives offered by the tax system for particu-
lar kinds of investment projects. In other words, the fixed-/? calculations
describe tax schedules facing different projects. But, in turn, we would
expect that the effect of these varying tax rates would be to stimulate
investment in low-taxed projects relative to more highly taxed invest-
ments. We would expect the allocation of capital among the various
combinations to adjust until an equilibrium is established in which there
exist no further opportunities for mutually profitable transactions. For a
given individual saver, arbitrage would result in an equilibrium in which
the same net rate of return was earned on each project. We might
therefore calculate an effective tax rate for each combination for a
common value for s rather than a common value for p. Arbitrage oppor-
tunities are limited, however, and in particular we do not think it reason-
able to assume that differences in personal tax rates can be eliminated by
arbitrage. This arbitrage might be possible for a husband and wife (in
systems where spouses are taxed separately), but it is unlikely to occur12 The Theoretical Framework
between unrelated persons. I may love my neighbor, but not enough to
transfer the legal ownership of my assets to his care. Moreover, a substan-
tial fraction of capital income now accrues to tax-exempt institutions
(such as pension funds), and if arbitrage could eliminate differences in
personal tax rates, then the only possible equilibrium would be one in
which all effective personal tax rates on capital income were zero. This
does not seem to us to be a reasonable assumption.
In practice, governments impose limits on the flow of savings from
households to institutions precisely to prevent full tax arbitrage. Hence,
in a second set of calculations for this study we assume that arbitrage
leads to an outcome in which all projects offer the same rate of return to
savers before personal tax. In other words, we assume a common value of
r for all combinations, and we call this thefixed-r case. For any given saver
(that is, given values of personal income and wealth tax rates), this case
implies that all projects yield the same value of s. But the value of s varies
from one saver to another if they face different personal tax rates. It must
be stressed that when arbitrage eliminates differences among projects in
the real rate of interest there must be differences in the pretax rates of
return on investment. Hence the tax system distorts the allocation of
resources. The value of p in this case is not uniform across projects.
Allowing for the possibility of arbitrage in the capital market equilibrium
does not rule out inefficiencies in the allocation of resources.
With a linear tax schedule, that is, one in which the rate of tax is
independent of the value of/? (or, equivalently, r) at which it is evaluated,
the tax rate on any given project will be the same in the fixed-/? case as in
the flxed-r case. Under a nonlinear schedule, as happens in practice, the
size of the tax rate depends upon the value of/? at which it is evaluated. If
the value for r in the fixed-r case implies a value for/? different from that
assumed in the fixed-/? calculations, then the two cases yield different
values for the tax rate. This results solely from the nonlinearity of the tax
schedule. More significant differences between the two measures arise
when we examine a weighted average of hypothetical projects in order to
assess the average marginal tax rate on investment in the corporate sector
as a whole.
2.2 Combinations of Hypothetical Projects
For each hypothetical project we compute an effective marginal tax
rate for both the "fixed-/?" and the "fixed-r" cases. A hypothetical
project is defined in terms of a particular combination of characteristics
that affect the tax levied on the returns from the project. The characteris-
tics we examine include the asset in which the funds are invested, the
industry of the project, the way the project is financed, and the ultimate
recipient or owner of the returns. Each hypothetical project is described13 Combinations of Hypothetical Projects
by a unique combination of these four characteristics. For each character-




The category for machinery includes plant and machinery, equipment,
and vehicles. We shall not be concerned with investment in financial
assets, research and development, or other intangibles such as a good
managerial team, trade contacts, or advertising goodwill. The study is
limited also to reproducible assets, so we ignore investment in land.




The precise definition of industrial sectors is as follows. Manufacturing
forms a natural grouping and corresponds to the same description in
standard industrial classifications (SIC). For the United States, standard
industrial classification manufacturing comprises SIC numbers 13-64.
The "other industry" group consists mainly of construction, transporta-
tion, communications, and utilities. It corresponds to SIC numbers 11,12
and 65-68. The "commerce" sector includes nonfinancial services and
distribution, which are SIC numbers 69 and 12-11. Those activities
excluded are agriculture, extractive industries, real estate, government,
and financial services.
Third, our three sources of finance are
1. debt
2. new share issues
3. retained earnings.
Debt is defined to include both bond issues and bank borrowing.




The first category includes indirect household ownership through taxed
intermediaries such as mutual funds or banks. The second category
includes indirect tax-exempt ownership through pension funds, the pen-
sion business of life insurance companies, and charities. The third cate-
gory includes funds invested as part of contractual savings made by
households via the medium of insurance companies, principally life insur-
ance policies, which are not tax exempt but are taxed at special rates. Our
choices for these categories of owner are motivated by their different tax
treatment. Although personal tax rates clearly vary within the personal
sector, the schedule is common to all households, and in the individual
country chapters below we describe the distribution of personal marginal14 The Theoretical Framework
tax rates in the respective countries. More substantial differences exist in
the tax-exempt status given to pension funds and charitable holdings.
Although deemed "tax exempt," institutions in this category may end up
paying some tax because of the asymmetric nature of the tax system. For
example, both Britain and Germany have imputation credits as part of
their corporate tax systems. In Britain the credit is refunded to tax-
exempt stockholders, whereas in Germany the credit is not refunded.
The effect of this difference is that tax-exempt institutions in Germany do
effectively pay some personal tax on dividend income. Finally, insurance
funds are often taxed in special ways, as described in country chapters
below, and we take into account the tax treatment of premiums and
distributions.
With three categories for each of four characteristics, the number of
distinct combinations we identify is 3
4, a total of eighty-one for each
country. In chapter 7 we compute the effective marginal tax rate for each
combination as well as the distribution of tax rates. To plot the distribu-
tion of tax rates, we need to know the proportion of investment identified
with any given combination. We assume that the marginal increase in
investment under consideration is proportional to the existing distribu-
tion of net capital stocks among assets and industries. Further, we assume
that the saving required to finance the investment is proportional to
existing ownership patterns. It might be argued that a marginal invest-
ment would not be allocated in proportion to existing stocks and that not
all ownership categories would provide the marginal finance. For exam-
ple, the size of funds held by the tax-exempt category might be limited by
legal ceilings on the sums households can invest in this favored manner.
Such limits are usually related to income, however, and we prefer to
consider a marginal increase in savings and investment that corresponds
to an equiproportionate expansion of the economy. Additional savings
are assumed to be made by all these ownership categories and are
invested in proportion to existing net capital stocks. Marginal investment
is assumed to be proportional to net capital stocks rather than gross
investment flows because the former are representative of long-run asset
requirements, while the latter are influenced by differing asset deprecia-
tion rates. Inventories, for example, form an important component of net
capital stock, while they account for a very small share of gross invest-
ment. With steady growth, the use of net capital stocks is equivalent to
the use of net investment flows for the allocation of our marginal invest-
ment.
This assumption about the nature of the marginal increment to savings
and investment determines the weights we apply to each combination
when we compute the distribution of marginal tax rates. The reader who
wishes to make alternative assumptions about marginal savings or invest-
ment may use the basic data on effective tax rates for each of the15 Combinations of Hypothetical Projects
eighty-one combinations to plot his own distribution. These data are
provided in Appendix B.
The mean of the distribution provides an estimate of the overall
marginal tax rate on the capital income generated from a small equipro-
portionate increase in the capital stock. Let k denote a particular com-
bination of asset, industry, source of finance, and category of owner.
Also, let a^ denote the capital stock weight for that combination
(Xoc/c
 = !)• The mean tax wedge on the marginal capital income, w, is
81
(2.7) vv= 2 (pk-Sk)(*k-
k=\
For the k\h combination, pk and sk are the real rates of return on the
investment and on savings, respectively. The additional capital income
generated, p, is given by
81
(2.8) p= X pkak.
k=\





In addition to the overall mean marginal tax rate, we calculate con-
ditional means by summing over appropriate subsets of combinations.
For example, we compute the mean marginal tax rate on investment in
machinery by summing over all combinations that involve machinery and
that correspond, therefore, to different industries, sources of finance,
and owners. There are twenty-seven such combinations. The construc-
tion of the ak weights is described in section 3 of each country chapter,
while overall and conditional means of marginal tax rates are presented in
section 4 of each country chapter. These tax rates are compared and
analyzed in more detail in chapter 7.
The overall mean tax rate derived from these calculations is an aggre-
gate statistic for the difference between the return to investment and the
return to saving in the economy as a whole. In many ways, however, the
distribution of marginal tax rates around the mean provides more in-
formation. The variance of this distribution reflects the distortion of the
pattern of savings and investment created by the tax system. The varia-
tion in tax rates has further implications for our measure of the aggregate
marginal tax rate itself. If the tax rate applicable to all combinations were
the same, then the overall marginal tax rate would be equal to this
common value, for both the fixed-/? and the fixed-r cases. But when tax
rates vary, the mean marginal tax rate will be different in the two cases. In16 The Theoretical Framework
the fixed-p case, wherepk is the same for all combinations, equation (2.9)
reduces to
(2.10) F=W*,
where tk is the marginal tax rate for combination k. In the fixed-r case, the
same equation reduces to
(2.11) T=
The mean marginal tax rate in the fixed-p case is a weighted average of
the individual tax rates, where the weights are the capital stock weights
for each combination. In the fixed-r case, the weights are the product of
the capital stock proportions and the pretax rates of return for each
combination. In order to produce the same value of r, the more heavily
taxed combinations require a higher value of p, and therefore they
receive a higher weight (akpk) in the fixed-r case. Hence the mean
marginal tax rate will be higher in the fixed-r case than in the fixed-p case.
The difference between the two means reflects the variance in tax rates
among different combinations. To illustrate this argument, consider a
simple example. Suppose there are two possible combinations and the
capital stock weights are one-half for each combination. Suppose, fur-
ther, the tax rate on the first combination is zero and that on the second is
50 percent. Then in the fixed-/? case,
If there are no personal taxes, then r — s from equation (2.6). In other
words, assume that the difference in the tax rates comes solely from the
corporate tax treatment of the two combinations. Since tk — (pk — r)lpk in
the fixed-r case, we have
(2-12) pk=T
J^.
Substituting this into (2.9) yields
(2-13) r=i ....




The greater weight given to the more heavily taxed combination pro-
duces a mean marginal tax rate of one-third in the fixed-r case, com-17 Combinations of Hypothetical Projects
pared with one-quarter in the fixed-/? case. The difference between the
two measures can be large when some combinations are taxed and other
combinations receive subsidies. Returning to our example with two
equally weighted combinations, suppose one combination is taxed at 50
percent and the other receives a subsidy of 50 percent. In the fixed-/? case
the mean tax rate is zero. But in the fixed-r case the mean is equal to
one-quarter, from equation (2.13). The fixed-r case uses weights given by
akpk, the additional pretax profits that result from the marginal incre-
ment to the capital stock. If both combinations are to earn the same r,
then the taxed combination must have a higher share of the additional
pretax profits than of the capital stock.
The choice between the fixed-/? and the fixed-r distributions of mar-
ginal tax rates depends upon whether we are more interested in the tax
schedule facing potential investors or in the proportion of marginal factor
income that is taxed away. Both are of interest, and we present results for
both distributions. The fixed-/? calculations are a better guide to the
schedule of tax rates levied on different combinations, and it is this
distribution of marginal tax rates that determines the welfare losses
resulting from the distortionary nature of the taxation of capital income.
In contrast, the weighted averages in the fixed-r case are a better guide to
the ratio of additional taxes paid to additional profits earned that results
from a small increase in the corporate sector capital stock. If the tax
schedule for each combination was linear, then the fixed-r weighted
average tax rates would always exceed the fixed-/? weighted averages. But
in a nonlinear schedule it is possible (though it occurs only infrequently in
our calculations) that the fixed-p tax rate exceeds the fixed-r tax rate for a
given combination by enough to offset the fact that in the fixed-r case
greater weight is given to combinations with high tax rates. Since our
primary interest is in the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest, we
focus mainly on the fixed-/? results.
In recent years, the interaction between inflation and the tax system
has been one of the most important aspects of the effect of taxes on
savings and investment. The expected rate of inflation enters into both
the determination of p in equation (2.5) and s in equation (2.6). We
examine the effect of inflation in detail below, and we calculate effective
tax rates for three different rates of inflation. First, a zero rate provides a
benchmark against which to judge other figures, and it describes the
impact the tax system would have if it were fully indexed. Second, we
look at an inflation rate of 10 percent per annum, a midpoint in the
historical experiences of our group of countries in the decade 1970-79.
We hope it is not too optimistic to regard this rate as an upper bound on
inflation for the next decade. This second rate enables us to compare tax
systems across countries for a common, and significantly positive, rate of
inflation. Finally, for each country we take the actual annual rate of18 The Theoretical Framework
inflation experienced in the decade 1970-79. This actual rate varied from
4.2 percent for Germany to 13.6 percent for Britain. The rate we take for
each country is an average of the rates of increase of the price deflators for
consumer goods and for investment goods in that country. Our interest is
in the level of inflation, not in relative price changes, so we use a common
inflation rate for all sectors of the economy.
2.3 The Cost of Capital Function
Given a value for p or, alternatively, given a value for r, we use
equations (2.5) and (2.6) to compute a value for the effective tax rate. We
therefore need an expression for the cost of capital function, c(r), for
each combination. In these expressions we shall assume that statutory tax
rates are known and constant over time, that there is perfect certainty,
and that inflation is uniform over time. Consider an investment project
with an initial cost of one unit (a dollar, pound, mark, or crown). Let
MRR denote the gross marginal rate of return to this increment to the
capital stock, and assume that the asset depreciates at a constant ex-
ponential rate 8. The rate of return net of depreciation is
(2.14) p = MRR-8.
For convenience, we assume economic depreciation is exponential, but
we distinguish carefully between economic depreciation and tax depre-
ciation. The latter is not generally exponential (or, in discrete time,
declining balance). For the moment we ignore corporate wealth taxes and
the tax treatment of inventories. If the corporate tax rate is denoted by T,
and the rate at which the company discounts cash flows in nominal terms
is denoted by p, then the present discounted value of the profits of the




_ (1 - T)MRR (2.15)
p + 8 — IT
Nominal profits increase at the rate of inflation, fall in value at the rate
of depreciation, and are discounted at the rate p. The value of the
discount rate is endogenous and depends not only on the real interest rate
1. To ensure convergence of the integral, we assume that p + 8 — iris strictly positive. In
the fixed-r case, this assumption places restrictions on the feasible range of values for r. Still,
for apparently plausible values for r, the restrictions are violated in a few instances. The
reader is referred to the country chapters for details. When p tends to zero, then the tax
wedge w is a much more informative guide than the tax rate / that hasp as its denominator.19 The Cost of Capital Function
and the inflation rate, but also on the source of finance, as we shall see
below. The cost of the project is unity, the initial payment for the asset,
minus the present discounted value of any grants or tax allowances given
for the asset. The present value of such grants and allowances we denote
by A. Hence the cost of the project is
(2.16) C=l-A.
For any given discount rate, the value of MRR that equates V with C is
the return the project must earn if it is to be an attractive investment.
Looking at it the other way round, if MRR is a given return on a marginal
project, then the net of tax interest rate the firm could afford to pay on the
finance obtained to purchase the asset is the value of p that equates V with
C. Setting V from equation (2.15) equal to C from (2.16) and using
equation (2.14), we solve to obtain the following relation between/? and
(2.17)
(1-T)
To derive an expression for A, we assume that grants and allowances
for investment take one of three forms. These are: (1) standard deprecia-
tion allowances; (2) immediate expensing or free depreciation; and (3)
cash grants (equivalent to tax credits). The proportion of the cost of an
asset that is entitled to "standard" depreciation allowances is denoted by
fi, and the present value of tax savings from standard depreciation
allowances on a unit of investment is Ad. If f2 denotes the proportion of
the cost of the project qualifying for immediate expensing at the corpo-
rate rate T, then the tax saving from this write-off is/2T. Finally, suppose
that the proportion qualifying for grants is denoted by/3, and that the rate
of grant is g. Then
(2.18) A=f1Ad+f2T+f3g.
There is no need to restrict the sum of/i,/2, and/3 to unity. At certain
times it exceeds unity (for example, when accelerated depreciation does
not reduce the base for standard depreciation allowances). Equation
(2.18) is capable of describing the full range of tax allowances and
investment incentives in the four countries studied here. The value of
standard depreciation allowances will depend upon the pattern allowed
for tax depreciation. Common examples are declining balance, straight
line, and other schemes under which the firm may switch from one
method of calculation to another partway through the asset's life. In each
case the present discounted value may be computed from the parameters
of the relevant legislation. Consider a simple example in which tax
depreciation is granted at an exponential rate equal to a (this is the
continuous-time version of declining-balance depreciation), and suppose20 The Theoretical Framework
that tax depreciation allowances are computed at historical cost. The




There are other assets (buildings in Germany and the United King-
dom, for example) for which the tax system usually provides straight-line
depreciation. In this case a tax lifetime, L, is specified for each asset, and
the asset may be written down for tax purposes by 1/L per unit in each
year until L years have elapsed. With straight-line depreciation,
(2.20) Ad =
PL
There exist more complicated depreciation formulas such as the
United States allowances for double declining balance with a switch to
sum-of-the-years'-digits partway through the tax life of the asset. Where
relevant, these formulas are described in section 2.3 of each country
chapter. For computational purposes we simply note that the value of Ad
is a nonlinear function of the firm's discount rate, which in turn is a
function of the real interest rate.
We turn now to the effect of wealth taxes on corporations and to the
tax treatment of inventories in periods of inflation (which itself is akin to a
wealth tax). Consider first a tax on the net worth of the company such that
an addition to the net capital stock of one unit raises the wealth tax base
by a unit. If the rate of corporate wealth tax is vvc, then in the absence of a
tax on corporate profits the wealth tax reduces the marginal rate of return
from MRR to MRR - wc. When there is a tax on profits at the rate T, and
the wealth tax is not deductible for corporation tax purposes, the net of
tax return to the company is reduced to (1 - T)MRR - wc. When the
wealth tax is deductible from the corporate profits tax base, the posttax
return is (1 — T)(MRR — vvc). Equation (2.10) now becomes
DC
V= f [(1 - T)MRR - (1 - dxj)wc}
(2.21) = [(I-T)MRR-(I-^TK]
p + 8 - IT
where d1 = 1 if corporate wealth taxes are deductible against the
corporate tax base, and
= 0 if wealth taxes are not deductible.
The remaining issue in the specification of the cost of capital function is
the tax treatment of inventories in periods of inflation. During each
accounting period, the book value of inventories changes for two reasons.21 The Cost of Capital Function
First, there may be an increase in the volume of inventories; second,
there may be a rise in the price of inventories. In part, this latter compo-
nent of the increase in book value reflects general inflation and would not
be taxed under a corporate tax system based on real profits. But in some
countries the use of historical cost accounting means that the inflationary
gain on inventories is taxed as current profits when inventories are turned
over. This realization of inventory profits for tax purposes can occur fairly
soon if traditional FIFO (first in, first out) accounting is used, or it can be
postponed almost indefinitely if LIFO (last in, first out) accounting is
used. We assume that v denotes the proportion of inventories taxed on
historical cost principles. Then a marginal investment of one unit of
inventories, if there are no relative price changes, will incur an additional
tax of TVTT per annum. This modifies equation (2.21), resulting in the
general form






P + 8 — TT
where d2 equals unity for inventories and zero for other assets. We may
summarize our discussion on the cost of capital by noting that if we
combine equation (2.22) with the definition of p, then the relation be-
tween the pretax real rate of return on a project and the firm's discount




It can easily be checked that, when there are no taxes, the values of
both p and s as given by equations (2.23) and (2.6), respectively, are
equal to the real interest rate.
The final step in our calculations is to relate the firm's discount rate to
the market interest rate. With perfect certainty and no taxes, the two
would be equal. In a world of distortionary taxes, however, the discount
rate will differ from the market interest rate and, in general, will depend
upon the source of finance. For debt finance, since nominal interest
income is taxed and nominal interest payments are tax deductible, the
rate at which firms will discount after-tax cash flows is the net of tax
interest rate. In other words, for the case of debt finance,
(2.24) P = I(1-T).
For the two other sources of finance, the discount rate depends upon
both the personal tax system and the corporate tax system. We define the
corporate tax system in terms of two tax variables. The first, defined
above, is the basic corporate tax rate T, the rate of tax paid if no profits are
distributed. The second variable measures the degree of discrimination
between retentions and distributions. The tax-discrimination variable is22 The Theoretical Framework
denoted by 9 and is defined as the opportunity cost of retained earnings in
terms of gross dividends forgone. Gross dividends are dividends before
deduction of personal income tax. Hence 0 equals the additional divi-
dends shareholders could receive if one unit of post-corporate-tax earn-
ings were distributed. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see King
(1977, chap. 3).
Under a classical system
2 of corporation tax (such as that in the United
States), no additional corporate tax is collected (or refunded) when
dividends are paid out, so the value of 0 is unity. With an imputation
system (such as that in the United Kingdom), a tax credit is attached to
dividends paid out, so the value of 0 exceeds unity. From the definition of
0, we know that if one unit of profits is distributed, 0 is received by
shareholders as dividends and (1 - 0) is collected in tax. Hence the
additional tax per unit of gross dividends is equal to (1 — 0)/0. The total
tax liability of the company—that is, total taxes excluding personal
income tax on both dividends and interest and excluding any capital gains
tax on retained earnings—is given by
(2.25) T=TY
where Y denotes taxable income and G denotes gross dividends paid by
the company.
With an imputation system of corporation tax, part of the company's
tax bill is imputed to the stockholders. If the rate of imputation is c, then
the stockholder receives a dividend before personal tax equal to the cash
dividend plus the tax credit of c/(l - c) per unit dividend. Hence, (0 — 1)
equals the tax credit per unit, and 0 = 1/(1 — c). When full imputation at
the corporate tax rate is granted (such that dividends are fully deductible
against profits for corporate tax purposes,
3 as in West Germany), then
Consider now the appropriate discount rate for the firm when financing
investment by new share issues. Potential investors would require a rate
of return on the money they subscribe to the company equal to i{\ - m),
where / is the nominal market interest rate. Suppose the project yields a
return net of corporate income tax of p. Then this required yield (that is,
the firm's discount rate) must be such as to equate the net of tax dividend
yield with the investor's opportunity cost rate of return. The former is
2. Our taxonomy of corporate tax systems follows the convention established by the
debate in the European Economic Community. For a full discussion, see King (1977, chap.
3).
3. A system where dividends are fully deductible at the corporate level and fully taxed at
the personal level is equivalent to a system where tax is collected on all profits at the
corporate level but is rebated to individuals on dividends received at the personal level.
Recipients are taxable on gross dividends 0 = 1/(1 - c), but they receive credit for c/(l - c),
the amount paid at the corporate level on those profits.23 The Cost of Capital Function
equal to (1 — m)6p, and the latter is (1 — m)i. This means that for new
share issues the firm's discount rate is given by
(2.26) p = i.
The use of retained earnings enables investors to accumulate at a rate
of return that is taxed by capital gains tax rather than income tax. This is
often attractive because the effective rates of capital gains tax are usually
significantly lower than income tax rates. If the yield of a project is p, then
the investor would require a yield such that p(l — z) = i{\ — ra), where z
is the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains. The discount rate for the
retained earnings is, therefore, given by
4
(2.27)
In practice, capital gains are taxed only on realization, and to allow for
the benefit of this deferral of tax, we must convert the statutory rate, zs,
into an effective accrued tax (or EAT) rate. For this purpose we use a
simple model of investor behavior. Let X be the proportion of accumu-
lated accrued gains realized by investors in a particular tax bracket in
each period. That is, a capital gain of one unit accruing in period one will
lead to a realized gain of X in period one and an unrealized gain of 1 - X.
In the second period realizations are equal to X(l — X). In the third
period, realizations are X(l - X)
2, and so on. If we assume that X is
constant, then the present discounted value of the stream of tax payments
resulting from a unit of accrued gain is given by






where pp is the investor's nominal discount rate. In general, the investor's
nominal discount rate is equal to s + IT.
When computing marginal tax rates, we substitute the expression for z
from (2.28) into equation (2.27). The EAT rate z is thus endogenous to
the calculations, because of its dependence on the market interest rate.
The tax treatment of capital gains is described in the appropriate sections
4. In practice, we often have data for the personal tax rate on dividend income that is
different from the tax rate on interest income. This difference occurs because holders of
equity are typically in higher tax brackets than holders of debt (and not because of different
tax schedules for interest and dividends). A potential investor in equity, with a single
personal tax rate me, would receive (1 - me)Qp on dividends, (1 - z)p on retained earnings,
or (1 - me)i on alternative investments. Hence equations (2.26) and (2.27). His value for s is
/(I - me) - TT - wp, and we have enough information to find both/? and s for any combina-
tion involving equity finance. A potential investor in debt, with personal tax rate md, would
receive a net return s = /(I - md) - TT - wp. The firm's discount rate for debt finance is
/(I - T), from equation (2.25), and again we can calculate the difference betweenp and s.24 The Theoretical Framework
of each country chapter. Except where capital gains are taxed as they
accrue (as for insurance companies in Sweden), we take a value of 0.1 for
A. This value implies that corporate shares have a mean holding period of
ten years (King 1977, chap. 3).
There is one further point to note concerning retained earnings. For
this source of finance the cost of capital is a function of personal tax rates.
The required rate of return on a hypothetical investment project depends
upon the tax rate of the investor. Yet by their very nature, retained
earnings cannot be attributed to only one group of stockholders (given
the restrictions on the tax treatment of stock dividends), and so the cost of
capital for a firm financing out of retained earnings must be the same for
all stockholders. There are several ways out of this dilemma. One would
be to consider a hypothetical project carried out by a firm owned entirely
by a single investor whose tax rate would uniquely determine the cost of
capital. Another would be to examine an equilibrium of the capital
market in which high tax rate investors owned equity and low tax rate
investors owned debt. A segmented equilibrium of this kind is sometimes
known as a "Miller equilibrium" (Miller 1977; Auerbach and King 1983).
Neither approach, however, is consistent with the fact that in all four
countries both tax-exempt investors and individuals facing the highest
marginal tax rates own corporate equity. A marginal project financed out
of retained earnings will use funds attributable to all types of investors in
proportion to their stockownership. Hence, we assume that for retained
earnings the cost of capital is a weighted average of the values given by
expression (2.27), where the weights are the shareownership proportions
of the different investors.
5
2.4 Computing Effective Tax Rates
The equations above enable us to calculate the tax wedge w and the
marginal tax rate t for each combination. In the fixed-/- case, we first
5. Further intuition for these equations is provided in section 7.4 (in the comparative
results chapter), where we look at the simple case with economic depreciation allowances,
no investment tax credits, no corporate wealth taxes, and no inflation. In this simple case,
equation (7.2) shows that discount rates for debt, new shares, and retained earnings reduce
to r{\ — T), r, and r(\ — m), respectively. Equation (7.6) shows that effective tax rates
reduce to m for debt, T + m(l — T) for new shares, and T for retained earnings. An
interpretation for new share issues is that the investment earns corporate profits taxed at
rate T and that the after-tax profits (1 — T) are distributed and taxed again at rate m. It is not
necessary, however, to assume that the income is actually distributed. Rather, the dividend
tax is relevant because it must be paid anytime profits are distributed. For retained earnings
finance, on the other hand, the dividend tax is not relevant because it must ultimately be
paid whether these funds are reinvested or not. (See Auerbach 1979; Bradford 1980; King
1977.) Finally, we might note that chapter 8 further discusses how the assumption of
arbitrage at the personal level implies discount rates that differ by source of finance at the
firm level. An alternative assumption of arbitrage at the firm level would imply rates of
return that depend on source of finance at the personal level. These differences might be
resolved in a model with uncertainty, but in this model they provide a further reason to
emphasize the fixed-/? case rather than the fixed-r case (which must choose a particular kind
of arbitrage).25 Computing Effective Tax Rates
compute s from (2.6), and then the firm's discount rate from equations
(2.24) through (2.28). With the resulting value of p, we compute/? from
(2.23). In the fixed-/? case, however, the calculations are more compli-
cated. Given a value for p, we solve (2.23) for the discount rate, but
iteration is required because the discount rate enters the expression for
depreciation allowances in a nonlinear fashion. For complicated depre-
ciation schemes the function is highly nonlinear, but we have checked
that our solution is unique in the feasible range. Then, given a discount
rate, we solve for the market interest rate. (In the case of retained
earnings, further iteration is required because the capital gains tax rate
depends upon the interest rate.) Then we solve for the posttax real rate of
return to savers, s.
The functional relationship between p and s is, in general, nonlinear.
The values of the tax wedge and the tax rate thus depend upon the values
of p and r at which they are evaluated. We investigate these relationships
in chapter 7. For most of our tax rate calculations, we use a value of 10
percent per annum for p, or 5 percent per annum for r.
One of the important relationships we investigate is the effect of
inflation on effective marginal tax rates. In the fixed-/? case, we assume
the same 10 percent value for/?, the real pretax return, at all inflation
rates. But in the fixed-r case we must be more careful. With an unindexed
personal tax system, higher inflation generally widens the dispersion of
effective tax rates. A tax-exempt investor remains tax exempt, but a
taxed investor pays tax not only on the real return but on the inflation
premium as well. This increased dispersion of effective tax rates is an
inevitable consequence of the arbitrage mechanism underlying our fixed-
r assumptions, in which all differences in posttax rates of return are
arbitraged away, except for those resulting from differences in personal
tax rates. With an unindexed personal tax system, therefore, an arbitrage
equilibrium is characterized by the dispersion of effective tax rates being
an increasing function of the inflation rate.
When comparing different projects at a given inflation rate in the
fixed-r case, arbitrage requires a constant real rate of return r. This
arbitrage argument is not relevant, however, when making ceteris pari-
bus comparisons among different inflation rates. It would be possible to
assume that r is fixed across inflation rates, but this real rate of return
(i - IT) is relevant to tax-exempt investors only. Since nominal interest is
taxed, other investors would experience a real after-tax return s that is a
decreasing function of the inflation rate. Instead, as our benchmark, we
choose to assume that the average value of s over all ownership groups is a
constant across inflation rates. As a consequence, the value of r is held
constant across projects at any one inflation rate, but it is not held
constant across different inflation rates. (This assumption and its alterna-
tives are further investigated in section 7.5.)
It is evident from (2.6) that if the average value of s over ownership26 The Theoretical Framework
groups is to be independent of the inflation rate, then the nominal interest
rate implied by our fixed-r calculations must rise with each percentage
point increase in inflation by a factor equal to unity divided by unity
minus the average personal tax rate. We stress that this is not an assump-
tion about how inflation actually affects nominal market interest rates.
There has been a great deal of debate about the effect of inflation on
interest rates, but our assumption is merely a ceteris paribus decision
about the value of r at which to measure tax rates. While alternative
assumptions are explored in chapter 7, the results for the fixed-r case in
each country chapter are based on the benchmark described here.
It is clear from the equations above that the effective marginal tax rate
depends upon the particular asset in which an investment is made, and
upon the industry, source of finance, and category of owner. To obtain
the solution to the system of equations for each combination, and to
compute the weighted averages, it is necessary to resort to a computer
program. Yet it is possible in simple cases to illustrate how the equations
operate and to demonstrate that they accord with our intuition. To
proceed, we consider two very special tax systems. Consider first a
personal expenditure tax on all investors combined with a cash flow
corporation tax in which all investment outlays are immediately expensed
(with negative tax payments where required) and in which interest pay-
ments are not tax deductible. We know that this tax regime imposes no
tax wedge between the return to savers and the return to investors (for
example, King 1977, chap. 8). With a cash flow corporation tax and no
interest deductibility, the firm's discount rate will be equal to the market
interest rate for all sources of finance. With this regime of immediate
expensing for all types of investment, then,/j = /3 = wc — v — 0. Also,/2
equals unity, and hence A—^. The result is that the value for p in each
combination is equal to the real market interest rate (/ - IT). With a
personal expenditure tax, m — z — wp = 0, and hence s — p. Thus the tax
wedge and the marginal tax rate are both equal to zero.
The other special case we consider is that of complete integration of the
corporate income tax and personal income tax and indexation of the
resulting integrated tax system. No corporate taxes as such are levied in
this case, and the investors' discount rate becomes that of the firm. With
an indexed tax system, this rate is equal to (1 — m)r + IT. There are no
wealth taxes and no taxation of inflationary gains on inventories. Tax
allowances are given only for true economic depreciation at replacement
cost. Hence f2 =/3 = 0, and/! equals unity, soAd = m8/(8 + p — TT). With
this expression it is easy to see from equation (2.17) that/? = r, the real
market rate of interest.
6 It is also clear that s =r(l - m). Hence, for every
6. When f2 =/3 = 0, /i = 1, and Ad = ——— , then (2.17) becomes 8 + p — TT27 Computing Effective Tax Rates
combination, the effective marginal tax rate is equal to the investor's
personal tax rate.
In practice, as we shall see, the complex tax systems that all of our four
countries levy on corporate income mean not only that the effective
marginal tax rate differs from the standard of either an income tax or an
expenditure tax, but that the tax rates vary enormously from one com-
bination to another. One of the major aims of our study is to document
this phenomenon empirically and to provide estimates of the magnitude
of the effect and of the proportion of investment that is channeled
through each of the combinations. These estimates enable us to compute
a distribution of marginal tax rates.
We conclude this chapter by noting a number of detailed points con-
cerning our methodology. First, we have omitted taxes on gifts and
estates from our calculations. These taxes may well be important in
particular instances where the principal motive for saving is to pass on
wealth to succeeding generations. Much saving, however, is channeled
through contractual schemes for life-cycle saving, and there are well-
known opportunities for avoiding taxes on gifts and estates. In each
country chapter we set out some relevant information concerning these
taxes, but their rates are not incorporated into our calculations.
We assume that all relevant tax allowances can be claimed. We assume
that firms engaging in our hypothetical investment projects have positive
taxable profits or, equivalently, that the tax system is symmetric in that it
makes refunds on losses at the same rate at which it taxes profits. In
practice, there are firms with negative taxable profits that are unable to
claim allowances. Tax losses can be carried forward, and in some cases
backward, so the fact that taxable income is currently negative need not
mean that the tax allowances are lost forever. However, in the cases of
Britain and Sweden there are grounds for believing the problem cannot
be overlooked. Simulations of marginal tax rates for companies that have
exhausted tax allowances are contained in section 4 of those two country
chapters. One of the main reasons for the rapid growth of leasing has
been the wish of "tax-exhausted" firms to lease assets from companies
1-T
_ 8(1 -m)-\
8 + p-TT, .
(p + 8 - TT) - 8
1-T
In the integrated system, p = (1 - m)r + IT (see text) and i - m. In this case,
8(1 — rri) + r(\ — m) + TT — -n
p =— 8
1 - m
= r.28 The Theoretical Framework
with positive taxable profits who could claim the tax allowances. Where
this is possible the effectiveness of tax allowances is not diminished.
We have made no explicit allowance for risk in our calculations, and
the equations above assume perfect certainty. In itself this is not a
significant assumption, in that the effect of risk is mainly to alter the
required rate of return on an investment project. A project that is
unusually risky will require a high rate of return, particularly if it has a
high covariance with other projects, thus reducing its value as an invest-
ment hedge. These differences mean that the value of r we choose to use
in the fixed-r calculations might differ for projects with varying degrees of
risk. But we wish to evaluate the incentives provided by the tax system,
and it seems sensible to use a common value of r (or p) for all projects.
Risk might vary from one industry to another or one asset to another, and
it is possible that our investor groups would have different degrees of risk
aversion and would choose different portfolios accordingly. These con-
siderations mean that we might wish to evaluate marginal tax rates at
different values for the real rate of return required by savers, but they do
not alter the principles underlying calculations of the magnitude of the
wedge the tax system imposes between a given rate of return on a project
and the rate of return that can be paid out to the supplier of finance.
The definition of tax-exempt institutions includes pension funds. The
tax treatment of contributions to pension funds does indeed imply a zero
marginal tax rate on capital income, provided the income tax rate against
which contributions may be deducted is equal to the income tax rate at
which ultimate pension benefits are taxed when paid out. In practice,
individuals may have higher tax rates during their working life when
making contributions than during retirement when receiving pension
benefits. To the extent that tax rates fall after retirement, the effective tax
on capital income from pension funds is negative rather than zero. Our
calculations slightly overstate the true marginal tax rate on capital income
in this case.
One difficult problem concerns the tax treatment of funds deposited by
households (or institutions) in banks and then lent by banks to com-
panies. This indirect form of debt finance, in contrast to direct purchase
of corporate bonds, has been growing in recent years. We assume in our
calculations that the banking system acts as a competitive financial in-
termediary and that, at the margin, it earns no monopoly profits on
interest receipts. Hence the only taxes we assume are collected on in-
terest receipts in connection with corporate borrowing from banks are
personal taxes levied on investors' interest income. At this point we draw
a distinction between time deposits and checking accounts. The former
pay interest at market rates (except in the United States, where legal
restrictions hold rates down; see chap. 6 for further discussion of the tax
treatment in this case), and investors pay income tax on such interest29 Computing Effective Tax Rates
income. For time deposits, we assume that interest payments are taxed at
investors' marginal tax rates. But where funds lent to firms originate from
an addition to checking accounts, then, in those countries where checking
accounts do not pay interest, the income accrues to households in the
form of tax-free banking services. On accounts of this type we assume
that the effective personal tax rate is zero. We assume that a marginal
investment financed by bank borrowing would come from the two types
of accounts in proportion to their existing deposits, such that the average
marginal personal tax rate on interest paid to banks is a weighted average
of zero (for checking accounts) and the investor's marginal tax rate (for
time deposits). A diagrammatic illustration of our assumptions concern-
ing the tax treatment of debt finance is given in chapter 3, where this issue
is first discussed with reference to a particular country. Refer to that
discussion for an empirical analysis of the taxation of interest income.
Net trade credit is excluded from our definition of debt finance. This
exclusion causes the magnitude of debt finance to be understated, par-
ticularly for the "other industry" sector in Sweden. The matter is dis-
cussed further in individual country chapters.
Finally, we have estimated rates of true economic depreciation for use
in our calculations. In our exposition, it was convenient to assume that
assets decayed exponentially, but in most countries national accounts
estimates of depreciation and capital stocks employ the assumption of
straight-line depreciation with lifetimes obtained from surveys or other
sources. To exploit these sources of data concerning asset lives, we ask,
What rate of exponential depreciation would give the same present
discounted value of the depreciation stream as is implied by straight-line
depreciation with an asset life of L years? If we discount at the real
interest rate (we are measuring real flows here), then the answer to this
question is the exponential rate 8 given by
(2.29) ^ (i
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Although the value of 8 in equation (2.30) depends upon the real
discount rate, a good approximation may be found in cases where the
product of the real discount rate and the asset life is small. Formally, it is
possible to show that
7
(2.31) lim (8) = |.
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
We use the asset lives provided by national accounts data and convert
to equivalent rates of true economic depreciation using equation (2.31).
2.5 Data Requirements
The data requirements for our study are as follows. First, we need a
detailed description of the statutory tax rates embodied in the tax system
and a detailed description of the parameters embodied in the rules that
enter into the definition of the cost of capital equations. Given these data,
we calculate effective marginal tax rates for all eighty-one combinations.
Second, we need weights for the proportion of total net capital stock that
can be identified with each combination. The construction of both kinds
of data is described in detail in each country chapter. The first section of
each chapter contains an introduction to the tax system and general
background on its rules. The tax system itself is described in section 2.
The capital stock weights are described in section 3. All data refer to the
calendar year 1980, or to the nearest tax year if the fiscal year differs from
the calendar year. To enable the reader to compare monetary values
across countries, we show in table 2.1 the matrix of exchange rates ruling
at the end of 1980. Our aim is to provide sufficient information about the
methods employed and the data used in our computations so that other
investigators may, first, repeat our calculations to confirm the results and,
second, extend the coverage to earlier time periods and to a wider range
of countries.